We argue on consequentialist grounds for the transfer of Sandai, an orangutan, to an orangutan sanctuary. First, we show that satisfying his interest in being transferred brings far greater value than the value achieved by keeping him confined. Second, we show that he has the capacities sufficient for personhood. Third, we show that all persons have a right to relative liberty insofar as they have interests they can exercise only under conditions of relative liberty. Fourth, we show that individuals need (...) not be able to assume social obligations and duties in order to be rights holders. -/- Our argument reflects commitments, as we say, to consequentialist reasoning about moral problems. However, we note that influential representatives of the other dominant ethical traditions—the deontological and Aristotelian traditions—reach our conclusion, too. It makes no difference, in this instance, which ethical theory one adopts. Under all of them, Sandai is a person with an interest in relative liberty entitled to habeas corpus protection. (shrink)

Chucho is an Andean bear who had lived most of his life in semicaptivity in a nature reserve in Manizales, Colombia. After his sister’s death, he became severely depressed, so the environmental authority transferred him to Barranquilla Zoo. A local lawyer filed a writ of habeas corpus based on Chucho’s right as a sentient being to live in his natural habitat. This writ has triggered a complex debate on nonhuman animal legal personhood and animal rights between two of the highest (...) courts in the country: the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court. (shrink)